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COURT, CONGRESS, AND REAPPORTIONMENT 
Robert B. McKay• 
I N the United States, governmental power is divided vertically be-tween nation and states and horizontally, at the national level, 
among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The Consti-
tution leaves the lines of demarcation deliberately imprecise. Thus, 
from the beginning it was easy to predict that among those holders 
of power there would be tension (at least), conflict (probably), or 
total collapse (a possibility). The miracle of the American govern-
mental system, with just this complexity and lack of definition, is 
the fact of its survival. It is not at all surprising that there have 
been a number of crises, some of which have seemed to imperil the 
whole edifice. 
Difficulties have recurred at least since the time of the Virginia 
and Kentucky Resolutions in 1798, which seemed to argue for 
the right of any state to reject action by any branch of the national 
government that the state, on its own interpretation of the Con-
sitution, might think an unwarranted exercise of power. Instances 
of resulting conflict bear such familiar names as the Hartford 
Convention of 1814, John Calhoun's theory of the "concurrent 
majorities," secession, and the "Court-packing" plan of 1936-1937. 
Congressional attempts to restrict the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, although surprisingly few in number, 
have been individually significant for their reflection of dissatisfac-
tion with Supreme Court decisions, actual or anticipated.1 As early 
as 1801, Congress postponed the convening of the Supreme Court 
for fourteen months in anticipation of adverse rulings on con-
gressional action.2 The post-Civil War case of Ex parte McCardle8 
was a dramatic illustration of congressional interference with Su-
preme Court action. More recently, congressional reaction to partic-
ular Supreme Court decisions boiled over in 1958 when the House 
of Representatives approved five bills which, if enacted, would 
have resulted in the most substantial restraint on the Court ever 
• Associate Dean and Professor of Law, New York University. 
I. For a general review, see Elliott, Court-Curbing Proposals in Congress, 33 NoTRE 
DAME LAw. 597 (1958). See also Lewis, The Supreme Court and Its Critics, 45 MINN. 
L R.Ev. 305 (1961). 
2. See I WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 169-268 (1922). 
The postponed decisions, both ultimately rendered in 1803, were Stuart v. Laird, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803), and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
3. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). The relevance of that case to present issues will be 
discussed infra. 
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imposed by Congress. That result, however, was narrowly averted 
by the defeat or tabling of each of those proposals in the Senate.~ 
The most recent, and in some respects the most troublesome, 
challenge to the integrity of the judicial process began its potentially 
destructive course shortly after the decision in Baker v. Carr/' the 
first of the reapportionment cases decided by the Supreme Court 
between 1962 and 1964. Initially, Congress played no direct part 
in the challenge. The Council of State Governments advanced three 
proposals for amending the Constitution: one, prompted by the 
decision in Baker, proposed the abolition of all substantive guaran-
tees against malapportionment, thus making action by the Supreme 
Court impossible and withdrawing the entire subject from the 
federal judicial power; a second would have established a "Court of 
the Union," composed of the fifty state chief justices, to meet in 
special cases to review decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States; and a third would have changed the method of amending 
the Constitution to give the power of initiating amendments to the 
legislatures of two thirds of the states. 6 At first there was not much 
public discussion, and a number of state legislatures promptly 
adopted one or more of the proposals. When the system-disrupting 
quality of the proposals was disclosed, 7 however, their further 
progress was abruptly halted. In a survey conducted by the Informa-
tion Service of the American Bar Association and released in May 
1964, it was revealed that only seventeen states had approved one 
or more of the proposals. It is possible that the failure of these 
proposals was due not so much to the cessation of state legislative 
concern over the future course of the apportionment issue (and, of 
course, other issues) as it was to the fact that these proposals were 
particularly ill-conceived. 
· Soon after the second round of reapportionment decisions was 
announced in June of 1964,8 Congress, which had played little part 
4. For that story, see MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT (1962). 
5. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
6. The text of the proposed amendments is set out, with an account of their origin, 
in A.mending the Constitution To Strengthen the States in the Federal System, 36 
STATE Gov'T 10 (1963). 
7. See, e.g., Black, The Proposed Amendment of Article V: A Threatened Disaster, 
76 YALE L.J. 952 (1963); Fordham, The States in the Federal System-Vital Role or 
Limbo?, 49 VA. L. REv. 666, 671-73 (1963); Freund, The Supreme Court Under 
Attack, 25 U. PITT. L. REv. 1 (1963); Warren, Dedication of the New Duke Law School 
Building, 1963 DUKE L.J. 387, 393. 
8. Lucas v. 44th Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 
377 U.S. 695 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Maryland Comm. for Fair 
Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 
(1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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in the just-ending controversy over the proposals of the Council of 
State Governments, took the center of the stage in a graphic display 
of the hostility with which many members of Congress regarded the 
Court, particularly in the context of apportionment. The issue rang 
all the changes of potential conflict in the American federal sys-
tem. It was Congress against Court in a straight separation-of-
powers issue; and, it also seemed to array the national government-
or at least one arm of it, the Supreme Court-against the pristine 
sovereignty of state power to ordain the composition of state legisla-
tures without restraint by the Constitution of the United States. 
When Baker v. Carr was decided in 1962, there was no indica-
tion that the heavens were likely to fall as a result of the ruling that 
the federal courts may-and indeed must-hear suits brought by 
properly qualified voters to challenge state legislative apportion-
ments that allegedly denied them the equal protection of the laws.11 
Despite the strong dissents of Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, there 
seemed to be a general willingness to allow the federal courts (and 
presumably the state courts as well) to take a look at the concededly 
serious malapportionment that was then the rule in most states. 
Perhaps not many then saw, as did the dissenters, that the logic of 
permitting judicial intervention under the sponsorship of the 
equal protection clause was likely to lead to fairly drastic demands 
for revision of both houses of bicameral state legislatures. Or maybe 
there was, even in 1962, a tacit willingness on the part of the public 
as a whole to follow the leadership of the Court on these issues, 
wherever it might lead. 
The notion that the general voting public was at least not 
unreceptive to judicial pronouncement of an equal-population 
standard gains modest confirmation from the immediate reaction to 
the reapportionment decisions in 1964. To appraise that reaction 
correctly it must be remembered that Reynolds v. Sims, on first 
reading, particularly if isolated passages are emphasized, appeared 
to be very strong indeed: 
"We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal 
Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a 
bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a popula-
tion basis. Simply stated, an individual's right to vote for state 
legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in 
a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citi-
zens living in other parts of the state.''10 
9. The editorial response was largely favorable. Newland, Press Coverage of the 
United States Supreme Court, Western Political Q., March 1964, pp. 15, 29-30. 
10. 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964). 
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What at first seemed the categorical command of that ruling 
was considerably softened by the Supreme Court's acknowledgment 
that "equitable considerations might justify a court in withholding 
the granting of immediately effective relief in a legislative apportion-
ment case, even though the existing apportionment scheme was 
found invalid."11 Nonetheless, the initial reaction was directed 
more toward prompt compliance than toward efforts to seek out 
"equitable considerations" for delay. Even before the Reynolds 
decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had directed an apportion-
ment based upon population in both houses, effective for the 1964 
elections.12 And, shortly after the equal-population standard was 
announced by the Supreme Court, apparently complete compliance 
was accomplished in several states, including Colorado,18 Delaware,14 
and Michigan.111 In addition, apparently good faith action toward 
reasonably prompt compliance was undertaken in a number of other 
states, including Connecticut,16 Georgia,17 Hawaii,18 New Hamp-
n. Id. at 585. 
12. On Feb. 28, 1964, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the then-existing 
· apportionment formula was invalid and allowed the state until May 1 to enact a new 
plan. When the legislature failed to comply, the state court ordered a complete reap-
portionment of both houses. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 22 Wis. 2d 544, 126 
N.W.2d 551 (1964), 128 N.W.2d 16 (1964). 
13. See Lucas v. 44th Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964). On July 8, 1964, 
the Colorado Legislature reapportioned the state senate by legislation effective in 
1964. N.Y. Times, July 9, 1964, p. 62, col. 3. 
14. See Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (19i4). On July 8, 1964, the Delaware Gen-
eral Assembly completed action on a reapportionment bill (promptly approved by the 
three-judge federal court), to establish an eighteen-member senate and a thirty-five 
member house, both based rather closely upon population. Wilmington Morning News, 
July 9, 1964, p. 1, col. 8. 
15. See Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962), cert. denied sub 
nom. Beadle v. Scholle, 377 U.S. 990 (1964). On June 22, 1964, the Michigan Supreme 
Court approved a reapportionment plan for both houses of the Michigan Legislature, 
as proposed by the Michigan apportionment commission, effective for the 1964 elec-
tions. See In re Apportionment of the Mich. State Legislature, 372 Mich. 243, 128 
N.W.2d 350 (1964). The plan is set forth in graphic form in the N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 
1964, p. E3, col. 1. 
16. See Pinney v. Butterworth, 378 U.S. 564 (1964). In response to an order of the 
three-judge federal court on remand of that case, the Connecticut General Assembly 
was convened in special session on Aug. 5, 1964, to seek a formula for the 1964 
elections. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1964, p. 39, col. l; id., Aug. 23, 1964, p. 49, col. l; id., 
Sept. 3, 1964, p. 12, col. 5. 
17. In Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962), the three-judge court 
had held that the apportionment of the Georgia General Assembly violated the United 
States Constitution. The state senate was thereafter reapportioned (GA. CODE ANN, 
§ 47-102). In a further order in the same case, the three-judge court, on June 24, 1964, 
enjoined the secretary of state from placing on the ballot in November 1964 a pro-
posed new constitution until the legislature "is reapportioned in accordance with con-
stitutional standards." Toombs v. Fortson, Civil No. 7883, N.D. Ga., June 24, 1964. 
18. Although the Hawaii Supreme Court refused to intervene to effect a reappor-
tionment effective in 1964, the Hawaii Legislature was convened in a special session 
on July 23, 1964. But it, too, had difficulty in agreeing upon an immediately effective 
plan. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1964, p. 41, col. I. 
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shire,19 New Jersey,20 New York,21 Oklahoma,22 and Vermont.23 
If the opponents of the apportionment decisions were at first 
somewhat quiescent, they were not to remain so for long. By mid-
July the Republican Party had been persuaded, perhaps unwisely 
from the standpoint of political advantage,24 to protest the decisions, 
calling for constitutional amendment or limitation on the jurisdic-
tion of federal courts. Meanwhile, various bills and resolutions were 
being filed in the Senate and House, seeking to postpone or deny 
the exercise of jurisdiction by federal courts in apportionment 
cases and proposing amendments to the Constitution. Representa-
tive Emanuel Celler of New York, chairman of the Judiciary Com-
mittee, reported that by August 19, 138 bills and resolutions 
had been offered in the House by ninety-nine authors and that, 
during the eight days of hearings, beginning on July 22, which 
were held before the Judiciary Committee, the Committee was 
unable to hear twenty-five members of Congress who wished to 
19. On May 20, 1964, a three-judge court withheld decision in a suit challenging 
apportionment in New Hampshire because of the imminence of a state constitutional 
convention, but cautioned that there was serious doubt as to the validity of the 
existing plan. In July, the constitutional convention adopted a resolution calling for 
an amendment to the state constitution to reapportion the house of representatives 
on a population basis, the proposal to be voted on in November 1964. N.H. Conven-
tion To Revise the Constitution, Journal, July 7, 1964. 
20. The New Jersey Attorney General filed a brief in the New Jersey Supreme 
Court urging the necessity for reapportionment to be completed in time for elections 
in 1965. N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1964, p. 18, col. 5. 
21. See WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964). On remand of that case, the 
three-judge court ordered that the legislators chosen in the November 1964 elections 
hold office for only one year, rather than the normal two, and provide a new appor-
tionment formula no later than April I, 1965. N.Y. Times, July 16, 1964, p. 1, col. 8. 
Meanwhile, Governor Rockefeller had appointed a study commission to report f>ack 
with recommendations before the end of 1964, although he later gave the commission 
until Dec. 1, 1964, to report its recommendations. Id., July 24, 1964, p. I, col. 5. 
22. See Williams v. Moss, 378 U.S. 558 (1964), affirming, modifying, and remanding 
220 F. Supp. 149 (W .D. Okla. 1963). On remand, the three-judge court invalidated 
primary and run-off elections already held and substituted a completely new formula, 
as proposed by the Oklahoma Attorney General, to be effective in the 1964 election. 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1964, p. 7, col. 3. 
23. A three-judge federal court ordered that no business except apportionment be 
considered at the 1965 legislative session and that new elections be held thereafter. 
See 110 CONG. REc. 18956-58 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1964). 
24. In the subsequent debate in Congress on various proposals to restrain or post• 
pone the exercise of judicial power in apportionment matters, the point was repeat-
edly made that Republicans would gain perhaps as many state legislative seats as they 
would lose if fair apportionment were to be accomplished everywhere. Senator Paul 
H. Douglas of Illinois, for example, suggested, as have many others, that Republicans 
could expect numerical gains in representation if suburban areas i;enerally are given 
the representation to which they are entitled in terms of population, particularly in 
the South. He argued at some length that the same would probably be true even in 
his own state of Illinois, although Republicans seemed unpersuaded. Id. at 19002-03 
(daily ed. Aug. 14, 1964). Senator Lee Metcalf of Montana made a similar point in 
connection with his state and suggested parallel possibilities elsewhere. Id. at 21042-44 
(daily ed. Sept. 8, 1964). 
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be heard, let alone the multitude of public witnesses who had 
offered themselves.25 During those hearings in the House, which 
were conducted with no more than "deliberate speed," the opponents 
of the reapportionment decisions suddenly came to legislative life 
in both houses. Observing how quickly action was being taken to 
comply with the letter and the spirit of the decisions and the im-
probability of congressional action during 1964, the opponents de-
cided to take extraordinary measures. 
The first, most dramatic, and most irregular action was taken in 
the Senate where S. 11380, the foreign aid assistance bill, had be-
come the order of business on July 31. Thereafter it was laid aside 
each day until August 7 for the consideration of other business. 
Meanwhile, on August 4, Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois, the 
minority leader, had introduced S. 3069 (Representative William 
M. McCulloch of Ohio introduced an identical bill in the House), 
which was designed to postpone the exercise of jurisdiction by all 
federal courts over all apportionment matters for a period of up to 
four years in some states. The operative text of S. 3069 was as 
follows: 
"Upon application made by or on behalf of any State or by 
one or more citizens thereof in any action or proceeding in any 
court of the United States, or before any justice or judge of 
the United States, in which there is placed in question the 
validity of the composition of either house of the legislature of 
that State or the apportionment of the membership thereof, 
such action or proceeding shall be stayed until the end of the 
second regular session of the legislature of that State which 
begins after the date of enactment of this section."26 
Senator Dirksen was completely candid as to his plans: 
"I trust that [the bill] will be referred forthwith to the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary. That committee will meet tomorrow 
morning, and I apprehend that, even without the benefit of 
witnesses, we may be able, as an emergency matter, to have the 
bill reported forthwith. Then I shall undertake to have it taken 
off the calendar and, in the form of an amendment, offer it to a 
bill in which I think it will have the best chance."27 
Thus Senator Dirksen launched a proposal for a drastic and 
mandatory limitation upon the jurisdiction of all federal courts to 
deny the fulfillment of constitutional rights as defined by the Su-
preme Court of the United States, suggesting that it be done without 
25. Id. at 19605 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1964). 
26. Id. at 17189 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1964). 
27. Id. at 17190. 
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any hearings whatsoever and proposing that it be added as a rider 
to important, but unrelated, legislation. Anticipating the indignant 
response this method would produce, Senator Dirksen merely in-
dicated that there was "no time in the present session to do anything 
with a constitutional amendment,"28 and that "we are dealing with 
a condition, not a theory.''29 Accordingly, recognizing that there was 
not sufficient sentiment in Congress at that time to secure approval 
of a constitutional amendment by the necessary two-thirds majority 
in both houses, he proposed that the status quo be frozen by immo-
bilizing federal courts in order to permit the mounting of a cam-
paign in Congress and throughout the country to reverse the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court. In short, Senator Dirksen was alarmed 
that there had been so prompt and favorable a response to the 
reapportionment decisions; therefore, he thought it necessary to 
resort to extraordinary measures in order to halt abruptly the al-
ready demonstrated willingness to comply with the equal-population 
principle. The case would not have been materially different if 
those who feel that the first amendment is dangerously libertarian 
would have proposed that Congress suspend its enforcement in the 
courts for a period long enough to allow them to seek its modifica-
tion or repeal. In one respect the Dirksen proposal was even more 
cynical, for his suggestion was that, after the period of enforced 
noncompliance, Congress should approve a constitutional amend-
ment to be ratified by the very state legislatures that are invalidly 
constituted under present apportionment formulas. 
Alarmingly enough, Senator Dirksen was successful in the initial 
stages of his bold maneuver. True to his prediction, the Judiciary 
Committee solemnly deliberated the matter on August 4 for forty-
five minutes (presumably denied more expeditious action by the 
objections of Senators Quentin N. Burdick of North Dakota and 
Philip A. Hart of Michigan, who alone dissented) and reported 
S. 3069 favorably on that day.80 Senator Dirksen then promptly 
made his decision to attach S. 3069 as a rider to the foreign aid 
authorization bill (H.R. 11380), the pending business of the Senate, 
which had been clearly designated as "must" legislation. 
There were immediate protests about the absence of hearings 
and the use of the rider device on such important legislation. The 
New York Times, for example, editorialized: 
28. Id. at 17189. 
29. Id. at 17190. 
l!O. The vote was ten to two. Senator Keating abstained, and two committee mem-
bers were absent. N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1964, p. I, col. I. 
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"Whatever may be said in favor of Senator Dirksen's move 
for a Congressional mandate delaying application of the Su-
preme Court order to reapportion state legislative districts on 
a 'one man, one vote' basis, there can be no question that he is 
·wrong in seeking to stampede it through Congress without full 
consideration of its damaging potentialities."31 
Two speakers before the Conference of Chief Justices, although 
differing in their appraisal of the reapportionment decisions, agreed 
that the Dirksen amendment should be defeated;82 and fifteen law 
school deans and professors advised Senators Mansfield33 and Dirk-
sen of their belief that the measure "unwisely and indeed danger-
ously threatens the integrity of our judicial process." They added 
that the bill would result in "drastic interference" with state as 
well as federal courts.34 
Objections to the merits of the proposal were soon voiced in a 
number of statements from various public groups, in newspaper 
editorials, and in Congress. Senators Burdick and Hart opened the 
Senate fight against the amendment by asking and securing unan-
imous consent on August 6 for the printing of their individual views 
on S. 3069 as part two of Senate Report 1328 on that bill: 
"This bill raises immediate and serious constitutional ques-
tions. Additionally, its scope and consequences are uncertain 
of understanding upon mere reading of its language. It could 
well cause the 'chaos' it professes to avoid. The bill affects the 
franchise of every American citizen as expressed in the election 
of State legislatures. 
"Under these circumstances, the committee owes the Senate 
careful hearings and full discussion based on an adequate record 
before action. There was no hearing; there is no record."815 
Eight other so-called "liberal" Senators agreed to join Senators 
Burdick and Hart in a substantial effort to resist passage of the Dirk-
sen amendment, which otherwise seemed likely to be enacted. This 
was critical since resistance in the House was not then--or even 
later-strong enough in numbers or in determination to oppose this 
or even more drastic legislation intended to restrict the Court. These 
ten Senators, later reinforced by a few more who were willing to 
speak in opposition to the Dirksen amendment and in support of 
31. Id., Aug. 6, 1964, p. 28, col. 2. 
32. Id., Aug. 7, 1964, p. 1, col. 4. 
33. Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana joined as cosponsor of the amendment 
when it was formally introduced on August 12. 110 CONG. REc. 18559 (daily ed. Aug. 
12, 1964). 
34. N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1964, p. 36, col. 1. 
35. 110 CONG. REc. 17850 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1964). 
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the reapportionment decisions, decided to "speak at some length," 
as Senator Morse put it when he called the plan a filibuster in which 
he was glad to join, describing himself as "the only liberal who 
admits that he filibusters."36 The Senators who agreed to speak in 
opposition, never more than twenty in number of active participants, 
took care to distinguish this "extended debate" or this "education 
debate" from the filibusters which many of them had unsuccessfully 
sought to forbid by amendment of the Senate rules. As the debate 
progressed, they pointed out, quite rightly, that they had kept the 
debate germane, allowed other Senate business to proceed while 
retaining S. 3069 as the pending business, and, in fact, had used up 
only twenty-six and one-half hours of Senate time by September 8.37 
It is of course possible that the decision to keep the debate germane 
and the willingness to allow the Senate to dispose of other business 
were not unrelated. There were times when it appeared to have been 
difficult to keep constant the flow of new and germane materials and 
Senators to present them. 
The fact is, however, that the sponsors of the "baby filibuster," as 
it came to be called, were successful enough in rallying important 
support for their position. By September 2, Senator Metcalf was able 
to read into the record sixty-eight newspaper edit(?rials (which he 
described as a random sample), more than two-thirds of which op-
posed the Dirksen amendment.88 Before the debate on the original 
S. 3069 had run its course, Senator Mansfield was showing signs 
of uneasiness about his cosponsorship;39 and representatives of 
the Department of Justice, expressing doubt about the constitu-
tionality of the original S. 3069, conferred with Senator Dirksen 
in efforts to persuade him to tone down the language of absolute 
negation in the bill as introduced.40 In an all-day conference on 
August 12 between legal aides of Senators Dirksen and Mansfield, 
Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, and Solicitor 
General Archibald Cox, a compromise bill was worked out which 
the representatives of the Justice Department concluded could be 
ll6. Id. at 19187 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1964). 
'!,7, Id. at 21005 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1964). Senator Proxmire added that, since August 
Ill, the Senate had passed eighty-nine bills and thirty-two resolutions, adopted seven-
teen conference reports, and sent ten bills to conference, "probably the largest number 
of measures acted upon during any comparable period in the 88th Congress." Ibid. 
38, Id. at 20716-llll (daily ed. Sept. 2, 1964). Senator Douglas introduced other 
editorials to similar effect on Sept. 1, id. at 20624-27 (daily ed. Sept. 1, 1964), and on 
Sept. 2, id, at 207ll9-46 (daily ed. Sept. 2, 1964). 
ll9. Id. at 19002 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1964). 
40. N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1964, p. 1, col. 4. 
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upheld as constitutional. The amended proposal41 was much the 
same as the original S. 3069 except that it contained a requirement 
that the issuance of a stay order could be excused in "highly unusual 
circumstances," a phrase not elsewhere defined. In the absence of 
such circumstances, the proposed substitute provided that any 
United States court having jurisdiction over an apportionment 
action "shall, upon application, stay the entry or execution of any 
order" relating to the election process or apportionment formula 
"for such period as will be in the public interest." The "public 
interest" was in turn defined to permit a stay long enough (1) to 
insure the conduct of any election of state representatives at least 
until January I, 1966, in accordance with state laws as they were 
before the judicial challenge and (2) to allow the state legislature "a 
reasonable opportunity in a regular session" or to allow the people 
of the state "a reasonable time" to effect reapportionment by con-
stitutional amendment following a court judgment that the state's 
apportionment does not meet the constitutional standard as ex-
pressed by the Supreme Court in June 1964. 
41. "(a) Any court of the United States having jurisdiction of an action in which 
the constitutionality of the apportionment of representation in a State legislature 
or either house thereof is drawn in question shall, upon application, stay the 
entry or execution of any order interfering with the conduct of the State govern-
ment, the proceedings of any house of the legislature thereof, or of any conven-
tion, primary, or election, for such period as will be in the public interest. 
"(b) A stay for the period necessary-
(i) to permit any State election of representatives occurring before January 1, 
1966, to be conducted in accordance with the laws of such State in effect 
immediately preceding any adjudication of unconstitutionality and 
(ii) ·to allow the legislature of such State a reasonable opportunity in regular 
session or the people by constitutional amendment a reasonable oppor-
tunity following the adjudication of unconstitutionality to apportion repre• 
sentation in such legislature in accordance with the Constitution 
shall be deemed to be in the public interest in the absence of highly unusual 
circumstances. 
"(c) An application for a stay 1mrsuant to this section may be filed at any time 
before or after final judgment by any party or intervenor in the action, by the 
State, or by the Governor or attorney general or any member of the legislature 
thereof without other authority. 
"(d) In the event that a State fails to apportion representation in the legislature 
in accordance with the Constitution within the time allowed by any stay granted 
pursuant to this section, the district court having jurisdiction of the action shall 
apportion representation in such legislature among appropriate districts so as to 
conform to the constitution and laws of such State insofar as is possible consistent 
with the requirements of the Constitution of the United States, and the court may 
make such further orders pertaining thereto and to the conduct of elections as 
may be appropriate. 
"(e) An order of a district court of three judges granting or denying a stay shall 
be appealable to the Supreme Court in the manner provided under section 1253 
of this title, and in all other cases shall be appealable to the court of appeals in 
the manner provided under section 1294 of this title. Pending the disposition of 
such appeal the Supreme Court or a Justice thereof, or the court of appeals or a 
judge -thereof, shall have power to stay the order of the district court or to grant 
or deny a stay in accordance with subsections (a) and (b)." 110 CONG. REc. 18846 
(daily ed. Aug. 13, 1964). 
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One section of the compromise seemed to endorse the Supreme 
Court decisions by authorizing federal district courts, when con-
fronted with legislative failure to correct malapportionment beyond 
the period of any authorized stay, to effect judicial reapportionment 
on their own. Presumably the Justice Department officials were 
willing to endorse the compromise because of this provision (al-
though undoubtedly Senator Dirksen contemplated a constitutional 
amendment before this provision could ever be used); because the 
way was left at least partially open for denial of a stay in "unusual 
circumstances" (although Dirksen thought the legislation was "about 
99 and 2/3 per cent mandatory"); and because this might get the 
foreign aid bill on its way once more.42 The liberals, however, were 
not at all satisfied with the new proposal. Senator Mansfield, in dis-
associating himself from the Dirksen motivation in sponsoring the 
amendment, stated his support for the Court's ruling, explaining 
that he had cooperated only to give the states a "reasonable" time to 
conform.43 The liberals responded to the Dirksen argument that 
failure to adopt his amendment would produce chaos in such states 
as Colorado, Connecticut, Michigan, New York, Oklahoma, and 
Vermont,44 by taking the offensive. Not only did they deny the 
validity of the contentions made concerning those states,415 but they 
also countered strongly that the Dirksen proposal would create "far 
more serious chaos"46 in as many as thirty-eight states.47 In many of 
those states, action had already been quietly taken by state legisla-
tures, courts, or executive study commissions. It was possible that 
1964 elections in many of these states could be upset if the Dirksen 
amendment should be enacted. Indeed, it was not at all clear that 
that was not one of the precise purposes for offering the amendment 
in that form. 
As the debate on the merits continued, both sides added further 
statements and editorials to the rapidly growing mass of material 
preserved "for the record." Walter Lippman and William S. White, 
for example, were quoted by the conservatives in support of post-
ponement of judicial enforcement;48 but the liberals were quickly 
able to counter with evidence of impressive support from the voting 
42. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1964, p. 1, col. 4. 
43. Id., Aug. 15, 1964, p. 1, col. 5; see also 110 CoNG. REc. 18871-72 (daily ed. Aug. 
ll!, 1964); id. at 21232-33 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1964). 
44. See, e.g., id. at 18842-46 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1964). 
45. Id. at 20209-13 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1964). 
46. Id. at 18959 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1964). 
47. Id. at 20210-11 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1964). 
48. See, e.g., id. at A4292 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1964); id. at A4317 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 
1964). 
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public directed against interference with the reapportionment deci-
sions; and that is, after all, an audience that is not uninfluential with 
Senators. On August 19 Senator Douglas cited the results of a 
Gallup poll published the day before, which indicated that through-
out the nation as a whole the Court's ruling was endorsed by the 
people by a three-to-two ratio.49 About the same time, the mayors 
of a number of principal cities expressed to the White House their 
concern about the current legislative attempts to curb the Court.150 
Senator Joseph S. Clark of Pennsylvania explained the support 
for the Dirksen proposal in this way: 
"All the talk about a crisis, which we heard in support of the 
Dirksen amendment, to my way of thinking, comes only from 
the politicians in the State legislatures, their friends, their syco-
phants, their supporters. It has no grassroots basis at all. It is 
merely the normal fear that someone will lose his job. There 
is no crisis except that some State legislators and those who 
follow them or whose jobs are contingent upon the continu-
ance in office of the State legislators, are afraid that if the people 
of a particular State had the right to choose their representa-
tives in proportion to their numbers, such individuals would 
not return to the statehouse."151 
Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff of Connecticut was even more blunt 
in opposing the idea of allowing existing malapportioned .legisla-
tures to make the decision as to whether malapportionment should 
continue. "To adopt the Dirksen 'freeze,' " he said, would be "to 
let the boy caught with his hand in the cookie jar decide whether 
he is to continue his illegal nourishment."152 
Up to this point in the debate the Administration had been 
silent, almost strangely so, since it has not usually been reticent in 
conveying views on pending legislation to Congress. True, there had 
been, in the background, the cooperation by officers of the Depart-
ment of Justice in the development of compromise language; and 
Senator Mansfield had lent his name. But it was not clear that the 
Administration was committed by these actions. Matters were in 
that posture when Congress adjourned on Friday, August 21, for 
the Democratic National Convention. President Johnson let it be 
known that he did not favor a specific endorsement of the Court's 
49. Id. at 19742 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1964). 
50. N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1964, p. 16, col. I. 
51. 110 CONG. REc. 19383 (daily ed. Aug. 18, 1964). Anthony Lewis of the New 
York Times observed that "This would seem to be strictly a politician's rebellion." 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1964, p. E3, col. I. 
52. 110 CONG. REc. 19792 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1964). 
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reapportionment decisions in the platform itself;53 and of course 
his view prevailed. This did not, however, indicate any presidential 
or party lack of sympathy for the Court or the rulings. Instead, the 
"usually reliable sources" expressed the President's belief that the 
attack on the Court should be blunted in Congress rather than 
directed toward public pronouncements that might inflame public 
feeling, making it more difficult for Congress to shunt aside the 
jurisdiction-restrictive proposals. "Never," one White House aide 
said in what may have been intended as a paraphrase of the Pres-
ident, "try to kill a snake until you have the hoe in your hand."54 
At about the same time, another suggestion was advanced for 
sidetracking the issue: perhaps it was a White House trial balloon, 
although it was not to be attributed to the President. The idea was to 
propose a resolution allowing continued spending of foreign aid 
money at previously authorized levels, leaving final resolution of 
the whole question until January 1965.55 But nothing further was 
heard of this, and the legislative posture was essentially unchanged 
when Congress resumed on August 31, after the conclusion of the 
Democratic formalities in Atlantic City. 
The legislative struggle in the House had meanwhile run its 
brief and decisive course without protracted debate or extensive 
moralizing. It will be remembered that Representative Celler, in his 
capacity as chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, had com-
menced orderly, albeit somewhat leisurely, hearings in July on the 
various proposals to limit or deny the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts on apportionment matters by statute or by constitutional 
amendment. Moreover, he made no attempt to conceal his unfriend-
liness to proposals to limit the Court's jurisdiction. After the suc-
cessful Dirksen ploy by which the issue had been maneuvered to the 
floor of the Senate and made the immediate business before that 
body, the critics of the Court in the House were no longer willing 
to work within the Celler framework of careful investigation of all 
points of view. In the House, too, the critics of the Court successfully 
employed an irregular tactic. On August 13 the Rules Committee, 
long the final resting place for legislation not favored by its chair-
man, Representative Howard W. Smith of Virginia, was moved to 
5l!. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2ll, 1964, p. 82, col. 1. The Attorney General, in answer to a 
question propounded to him when he appeared before the Platform Committee, said: 
"The Department of Justice is opposed to tampering by legislation or constitutional 
amendment with the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States." Id. at 19941 
(daily ed. Aug. 20, 1964). 
54. Ibid. 
55. Ibid. 
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precipitate action. By a vote of ten to four the Committee cleared 
H.R. 11926, which had· been earlier introduced by Representative 
William M. Tuck of Virginia. That bill, designed to deny the 
Supreme Court the right to review any action on reapportionment 
by any federal or state court and to deny jurisdiction over such 
matters to federal district courts, read as follows: 
"The Supreme Court shall not have the right to review the 
action of a Federal court or a State court of last resort con-
cerning any action taken upon a petition or complaint seeking 
to apportion or reapportion any legislature of any State of the 
Union or any branch thereof. . . . 
"(c) The district courts shall not have jurisdiction to enter-
tain any petition or complaint seeking to apportion or reappor-
tion the legislature of any State of the Union or any branch 
thereof." 
Speaker John W. McCormack of Massachusetts declared himself 
against the bill; but the Democratic leader, Representative Carl 
Albert, who expressed concern about the apportionment situation 
in his home state of Oklahoma, supported the bill, as did the 
Republican leadership.156 
For the next several days the bill was not specifically the pending 
business, and for a time there were only sporadic comments on the 
reapportionment issue. However, the desultory debate came into 
sharp focus when Representative Smith, using another rare but not 
unprecedented parliamentary device, announced on August 19: 
"Mr. Speaker, I call up House Resolution 845 [ embodying H.R. 
11926] and ask for its immediate consideration."157 The point of 
order raised by Representative James G. O'Hara of Michigan, chal-
lenging the jurisdiction of the Rules Committee to take this action, 
was overruled with a recitation of four precedents dating from 1895, 
suggesting that the move had not caught the Speaker entirely un-
aware;158 nor was the ruling changed as a result of Representative 
Celler's reminder that, when Representative Smith was a minority 
member of the Rules Committee, he "took a stand in opposition 
to the very type of action he is taking now."159 The debate on the 
point of order and on the merits was quickly over (nine pages of the 
Congressional Record); doubts as to the constitutionality and wis-
dom of the proposal, which were later to prove persuasive to a 
substantial majority of the Senate when confronted with the same 
56. Id., Aug. 14, 1964, p. 1, col. 8. 
57. 110 CONG. REc. 19580 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1964). 
58. Id. at 19580-81. 
59. Id. at 19581. 
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bill, were easily shrugged off in the House with a favorable vote of 
242 to 148.60 
It may be that the House did not then, either as an institution 
or as a collection of individual participants, seriously intend the 
enactment of this drastic legislation. It had been understood from 
the beginning of the debate that the Senate was not so much in 
search of a bludgeon to maim as it was for a scalpel to excise the 
offending judicial rule with as little bloodletting as possible. There 
was at least corridor talk at the time that, if the House revealed 
itself in an angry mood-and unquestionably much of the reaction 
was just that-this reaction would offer helpful leverage to secure 
the necessary majority in the Senate for some milder action. But, of 
course, this is mostly speculation; certainly, a number of the Repre-
sentatives saw the issue in highly personal and pragmatic terms. 
Although none of the proposals sought directly to overrule the 
Supreme Court's congressional districting decision, which required 
that congressional districts be "as nearly equal as is practicable" in 
population,61 there is no doubt that those who saw their own seats 
threatened by that decision were glad to strike out, however wildly, 
at the cognate state legislative reapportionment decisions. 
When Congress reconvened on August 31, Senator Dirksen, 
perhaps sensing that his support was ebbing away, or at least not 
increasing, announced his intention to close debate if possible. On 
September 8 he moved for cloture, with seventeen Senators joining, 
and it was announced that under the Senate rules the vote would be 
taken two days later.62 During the narrowly limited and equally 
divided time allowed for debate prior to the vote on the motion 
for cloture, the previously advanced arguments were rehearsed once 
more. The arguments against were summarized most succinctly by 
Senator Frank Church of Idaho: 
"I have concluded that, regardless of how one approaches it, 
the Dirksen rider is wrong. It is ·wrong to force a vote upon it 
without benefit of committee hearings; it is wrong to attach it 
to the foreign aid bill, where it has no place, and thus to coerce 
the consent of the President. But, above all, it is ·wrong on its 
merits, because it seeks to suspend the Constitution of the 
United States as that document relates to the right of each 
citizen to have representation in his State legislature which is 
as equal as possible to that of all other citizens of his State. 
"I do not believe that it is within the power of the Con-
60. Id. at 19589. 
61. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
62. 110 CoNG. REc. 21004 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1964). 
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gress to suspend the Constitution, either in this, or any other 
particular. If the Dirksen rider were to pass, I believe that it 
would be promptly struck down by the courts. The folly of our 
action would then be matched by its futility." 63 
The constitutional argument that Senator Church summarized 
had, of course, been made more fully in earlier debate, both in the 
Senate and the House. The constitutional doubts were determinative 
for some, at least in the Senate, which was manifestly unwilling to 
take seriously the House-approved Tuck bill, and for some in oppo-
sition to the Dirksen amendment as originally proposed. Because 
even the modified Dirksen proposal was thought by many not to be 
free of constitutional difficulties, it is appropriate to examine those 
contentions somewhat more fully. 
The premise of all these jurisdiction-denying or jurisdiction-
limiting proposals was the same. Article III of the Constitution 
vests the judicial power of the United States in the Supreme Court 
"and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time 
ordain and establish." The same article provides for appellate juris-
diction of the Supreme Court, "with such Exceptions, and under 
such Regulations as the Congress shall make." Thus, it was con-
tended (1) that Congress may discontinue the lower federal courts or 
withdraw from them any portion of jurisdiction previously con-
ferred upon them and (2) that Congress may withdraw all or any 
selected portion of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 
Scarcely any constitutional lawyer contends that the argument in 
that extreme form is supportable, although that is exactly the as-
sumption of the House-approved Tuck bill. As previously noted, 
passage of that bill by the House was an act of legislative irresponsi-
bility which did not at all commend itself to the Senate as a whole 
or even to Senator Dirksen. There was general agreement in the 
Senate that a categorical withdrawal of federal court jurisdiction 
in a class of cases otherwise within the article III power would not 
be sustainable. 
Much the same argument was also made, again quite properly, 
against the original Dirksen amendment, which purported to de-
prive the federal courts of all jurisdiction over apportionment mat-
ters for as many as four years in some instances. Moreover, it suffered 
an additional disability that was not shared even by the Tuck bill: 
by purporting to withdraw all judicial power from the federal courts, 
the original Dirksen amendment would have left the state courts 
63. Id. at 21226 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1964). 
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as courts of last resort on all matters of apportionment; under the 
supremacy clause of the Constitution in article VI, state courts 
would then be bound to apply the same constitutional doctrine as 
would the federal courts if they had been permitted to act. Propo-
nents of the Dirksen proposal apparently assumed either that the 
state courts would disregard the equal-population principle laid 
down in Reynolds (an unworthy suggestion) or, if state courts 
showed a willingness to act as required by the Constitution, that a 
suit could always be commenced in a federal court to challenge 
some feature of the state apportionment scheme, whereupon the 
federal court would be required to stay further action by state or 
federal courts. If this was an intended consequence of the Dirksen 
amendment, as its language suggests, the proposal was almost un-
paralleled in its disregard for the integrity of the state as well as 
the federal judicial process. 
The only support cited for the permissibility of closing the 
federal courts in specified classes of litigation is the case of Ex parte 
McCardle,64 a case exceptional on its facts, although never spe-
cifically overruled. There are at least two difficulties with that case 
as authority. One is that Mccardle involved only congressional with-
drawal of jurisdiction from the Supreme Court as to appeals from 
lower federal courts. Congress had not attempted to withdraw the 
exercise of original habeas corpus jurisdiction, either from the lower 
federal courts or from the Supreme Court. Even more important, 
Congress had not attempted the much more critical interference 
with the judicial branch and with the functioning of the federal 
system that was now suggested, namely, a denial of appellate juris-
diction in review of state court decisions. To take away this power 
would be to negate what has always been considered the most im-
portant aspect of judicial review and to alter fundamentally the char-
acter of the federal system. As Mr. Justice Holmes long ago observed, 
"I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost 
our power to declare an act of Congress void. I do think the Union 
would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the 
• laws of the several states."65 The proposal, therefore, would be of 
dubious constitutionality even assuming that Mccardle was correctly 
decided on its facts. But that assumption is doubtful, for, as Mr. 
Justice Douglas recently stated, "There is a serious question whether 
the Mccardle case could command a majority view today."66 In the 
64. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). 
65. Holmes, Law and the Court, in CoLI.ECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (1920). 
66. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 605 (1962) (dissenting opinion). 
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same case, Mr. Justice Harlan, while not so specifically disavowing 
Mccardle on its narrow facts, observed, "The authority [of Congress] 
is not, of course, unlimited."67 
The proposal is uncomfortably close to an 1870 act of Congress 
that the Court invalidated in United States v. Klein, 68 distinguishing 
that case from the McCardle case which had been decided three 
years earlier. In Klein the Court passed upon an act by which 
Congress purported to withdraw jurisdiction from the Court of 
Claims, and from the Supreme Court on appeal, of cases involving 
claims for indemnification for property captured during the Civil 
War, which both courts had previously held might be predicated 
upon an amnesty awarded by the President. The Court refused to 
apply the statute to a case in which the Court of Claims had already 
held the claimant entitled to recover, calling it an unconstitutional 
attempt to invade the judicial province by prescribing a rule of 
decision in a pending case. In a mildly sardonic vein the Court said: 
"We must think that Congress had inadvertently passed the limit 
which separates the legislative from the judicial power."69 The 
original Dirksen rider to the foreign aid bill was similarly defective, 
in view of the fact that the Constitution gives to the courts the 
responsibility for deciding when an order staying proceedings shall 
issue. Such an order is a necessary adjunct of the judicial power; 
without it the judicial power is something less than entire. 
The substituted version of the Dirksen amendment, for all its 
leaving of the jurisdictional door slightly ajar, was regarded by the 
opponents of the original rider as scarcely less objectionable. It has 
been suggested that this proposal, unlike the jurisdiction-denying 
bills, was not based upon the congressional power to regulate and 
make exceptions to the exercise of federal judicial power, but in-
stead was based upon the affirmative power conferred upon Congress 
by section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to enforce the substantive 
provisions of that amendment. Apparently the argument was that, 
since the Court has said that state legislative apportionment is 
regulable under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment, Congress too can operate to define and regulate the 
judicial exercise of that authority. 
It is difficult to believe that the modified Dirksen proposal could 
be regarded as an exercise of the "power to enforce" the Supreme 
Court interpretation of the equal protection clause in the reappor-
67. Id. at 568. 
68. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). 
69. Id. at 147. 
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tionment cases. In Reynolds the Court emphasized the present right 
of voter-plaintiffs to a validly apportioned state legislature and 
noted, as follows, the necessity for prompt correction of malap-
portionment: 
"It is enough to say that, once a State's legislative apportion-
ment scheme has been found to be unconstitutional, it would 
be the unusual case in which a court would be justified in not 
taking appropriate action to insure that no further elections 
are conducted under the invalid plan."70 
The Dirksen proposal would not only permit, but would require, an 
approach opposite to the language of Reynolds. It would require 
delay of apportionment action "in the absence of highly unusual 
circumstances." Thus, to describe the proposal as an exercise of 
congressional power to enforce or implement the protections of the 
fourteenth amendment is surely a perversion of plain meaning 
that should not be tolerated. The whole proposal was thus infected 
with serious doubt as to its constitutionality. 
Senator Dirksen made the principal argument, technically in 
support of cloture but realistically addressed to the merits of the 
Supreme Court decisions and the necessity, as he saw it, for resort 
to drastic and unusual parliamentary devices in order to avoid fore-
closure of the opportunity for adoption of a constitutional amend-
ment. He said in part: 
"It has been alleged on the floor, and in editorials, that this 
is an attack on the Court. I could use an inelegant term to 
describe those allegations. But I shall content myself with 
saying that nothing could be further from the truth. . . . 
"The amendment before the Senate is a breather. It is 
nothing more. We had no choice on the question. Our resolu-
tion [for amendment of the Constitution] was submitted, but 
how could we do something about it before the present session 
of the Congress adjourned?"71 
Believing that there was substantial interest in Congress for securing 
some kind of delay in the judicial enforcement of the apportionment 
rulings, Dirksen argued, in effect, that his proposal was the middle 
way. On the one hand, the Tuck bill, if approved by both houses of 
Congress, "would be vetoed" at the ·white House, he contended.72 
On the other hand, he rejected as insufficient a "sense of Congress" 
resolution, which Senators Jacob K. Javits, Hubert H. Humphrey, 
70. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964). (Emphasis added.) 
71. ll0 CONG. REc. 21228-29 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1964). 
72. Id. at 21229. 
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and Eugene J. McCarthy had sponsored as a less drastic alternative. 
That resolution, which Senator Javits had said would be offered as 
a substitute for the Dirksen amendment, read as follows in its 
original form: 
"It is the sense of the Congress that in any action or pro-
ceeding in any court of the United States or before any justice 
or judge of the United States in which there is placed in ques-
tion the validity of the composition of any house of the legis-
lature of any State or the apportionment of the membership 
thereof, adequate time should be accorded (1) to such State to 
conform to the requirements of the Constitution of the United 
States relating to such composition or apportionment consist-
ently with its electoral procedures and proceedings and with its 
procedure and proceedings for the amendment of the constitu-
tion of such State, and (2) for consideration by the States of any 
proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
relating to the composition of the legislatures of the several 
States, or to the apportionment of the membership thereof, 
which shall have been duly submitted by the Congress to the 
States for ratification."73 
That proposal was derided by Senator Dirksen: 
"Is it not wonderful for this legislative, coordinate branch of 
the government to get on its knees and say to the Court, 'Please, 
Mr. Court, be gracious, be graceful. Let us give them adequate 
time'? We are asked to beg a little. I do not propose to beg, 
because that demeans the dignity and authority of this branch 
of government."74 
Needless to say, a motion for cloture always raises issues extraneous 
to the substance of the issue at hand. As Senator John L. McClellan 
of Arkansas noted, in explaining the likelihood of his vote against 
the cloture motion, he was "against cloture as a legislative weapon," 
but might be impelled at some later time to vote for cloture in view 
of the fact that it had been invoked "against me and my State" in 
connection with the civil rights legislative battle earlier in the 
summer, largely at the instance of the so-called northern liberals.75 
Although presumably the proponents of cloture had not ex-
pected to be successful on a first vote, they were apparently sur-
prised to find their motion decisively defeated by a vote of thirty 
to sixty-three.76 Senator Javits then indicated his intention to seek 
substitution of his "sense of Congress" resolution; but Senator 
73. Id. at 21227. 
74. Id. at 21229. 
75. Ibid. 
76. Id. at 21236. 
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George D. Aiken of Vermont would have none of this, fearing that 
the previous vote might be taken as a two-to-one vote of confidence 
in the Court. Accordingly, as a test of strength, he moved to table 
the Dirksen amendment, indicating his intention to vote against 
tabling so that it would finally be possible "to find out how the 
Senate stands on the Mansfield-Dirksen amendment."77 The motion 
to table was rejected thirty-eight to forty-nine, and Senator Javits' 
proposal was promptly laid before the Senate on the motion of 
Senator McCarthy by unanimous consent. Then, with apparent 
relief the Senate turned for the moment to other business, in-
cluding such fascinating matters as the Bobby Baker case.78 
Debate now left the floor, again in favor of the corridors and 
offices. Some of the liberals, emboldened by their success in defeating 
cloture by a substantial margin, expressed dissatisfaction with the 
Javits compromise on the following grounds: (1) it might carry an 
implication that Congress was committed to a constitutional amend-
ment on the subject of apportionment (which Senator Javits had 
indeed indicated he would support); (2) the language of the resolu-
tion, although precatory, might be regarded by the courts as an 
interference with their right to dispose of cases; and (3) the com-
promise might serve Senator Dirksen's purpose of letting malappor-
tioned state legisla,tures pass upon a constitutional amendment de-
signed to keep them malapportioned.79 
President Johnson's support of the "sense of Congress" resolution 
was indicated, and ways were sought to modify the language to win 
further liberal support for the vote expected on September 15.80 By 
the night before the projected vote, some modification in the lan-
guage of the resolution was tentatively agreed upon: to give states 
a "reasonable time," rather than an "adequate time," to conform 
to constitutional requirements; and to provide, with respect to a 
possible constitutional amendment, only that the courts could take 
such fact into account "in the event" of submission of such an 
amendment to the states by Congress.81 
Thus, all seemed set for resolution by compromise, in customary 
legislative fashion, of the whole troublesome business. When the 
compromise of the compromise was introduced on September 15, 
however, several of those relied upon for passage were absent, and 
77. Id. at 21240. 
78. Id. at 21241. 
79. N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1964, p. 1, col. 2. 
80. Id., Sept. 14, 1964, p. 1, col. 2. 
81. Id., Sept. 15, 1964, p. I, col. 6. 
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Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon, unpredictable as always, voted 
against the resolution, which was defeated by a vote of forty to forty-
two. 82 But, when Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina (on 
his last day as a Democrat)83 forced a vote on the House-approved 
Tuck bill, that too was rejected by a vote of twenty-one to fifty-
five. 84 The Javits proposal was studied for the possibility of a "mean-
ingful" change, as required by Senate rules before resubmission. 
And, again, there was confidence that a successful vote could be 
achieved, presumably still permitting adjournment in time for the 
political rituals prior to November 3.85 
The rest was downhill and surprisingly undramatic. Senators 
Dirksen and Mansfield made one further attempt to work out new 
language that would be acceptable to a majority of the Senate. On 
September 22 they tentatively agreed to modify the already once 
modified Dirksen proposal by defining the "reasonable period" 
during which courts should stay their hand on apportionment mat-
ters as the length of one regular session of a state legislature plus 
thirty days. Moreover, in a significant change of position, they 
expressed willingness not to interfere with any court order pre-
viously entered. 86 While these were important concessions, appar-
ently they now came too late and may have been too little in the 
eyes of the liberal bloc, who by this time sensed the possibility of 
almost complete victory. The very next day Senator Mansfield, now 
acting primarily in his capacity as majority leader, gave up the 
fight for a mandatory restriction upon the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts. Obviously disturbed by the absence of a quorum on three 
consecutive days, he reviewed the situation candidly on the Senate 
floor: 
"It is clear that there is not the substantial majority which 
is necessary to invoke cloture on the Dirksen-Mansfield amend-
ment. It is also clear that there is not a majority to table the 
amendment .... 
". . . The leadership lives in the hope that one day reason 
will be permanently enshrined in this body and that the rules 
will be used and not abused, whether the issue is civil rights or 
reapportionment or whatever. There is only one reasonable way 
to redeem the reputation of the Senate in this kind of situation. 
That is by the adjustment of positions .... "87 
82. Id., Sept. 16, 1964, p. 1, col. 5. 
83. Id., Sept. 17, 1964, p. 25, col. I. 
84. Id., Sept. 16, 1964, p. 1, col. 5. 
85. Id., Sept. 17, 1964, p. 1, col. 7. 
86. N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1964, p. 1, col. 8. 
87. llO CONG. R.Ec. 21865 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1964). 
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Senator Mansfield's "adjustment" was substantial, for the sub-
stitute amendment that he offered simply turned the Dirksen 
amendment inside out. The Mansfield proposal of September 23 
said merely that courts "could properly" (1) "allow" the legislatures 
additional time for reapportionment, but such time was not to 
exceed six months, and (2) "permit" the next election of state 
legislatures to be conducted in accordance with the laws in effect 
on September 20, 1964. Moreover, the resolution specifically ap-
proved reapportionment by the federal courts in the event of legis-
lative failure to act within any grace time permitted by court order.88 
The Mansfield sense-of-Congress resolution was approved the 
following day, September 24, by a vote of forty-four to thirty-eight.89 
The vote was largely, but by no means entirely, along party lines; 
because fifteen Democrats voted against the resolution, it could not 
have carried without the seven Republican votes it received.90 
With this matter out of the way, the Senate was able to give 
prompt approval to the foreign aid assistance bill. The final scene, 
then, was played out in the Conference Committee that was con-
vened to resolve differences between the Senate and House versions 
of the foreign aid legislation. There the apportionment rider was 
eliminated altogether,91 and both houses approved the conference 
version.92 
Thus, the whole fight to deny, restrict, or even temper the juris-
diction of the federal courts on apportionment matters at last came 
88. The full text was as follows: 
"It is the sense of Congress that, (a) In any action in any district court of the 
United States in which the constitutionality of the apportionment of representa-
tion in a State legislature or either house thereof is drawn in question, any order 
affecting the conduct of the State government, the proceedings of any house of 
the legislature thereof, or of any convention, primary or election could properly, 
in the absence of unusual circumstances, including those which could make 
unreasonable or embarrassing demands on a State in adjusting to the require-
ments of the court's order, 
"(I) allow the legislature of such State the length of time provided for a regular 
session of the legislature plus 30 days but not to exceed 6 months in all, to appor-
tion representation in such legislature in accordance with the Constitution, and 
"(2) permit the next election of members of the State legislature following the 
effective date of this act to be conducted in accordance with the laws of such 
State in effect on September 20, 1964. 
"(b) In the event that a State fails to apportion representation in the legisla-
ture in accordance with the Constitution within the time granted by any order 
pursuant to this section, the district court having jurisdiction of the action shall 
apportion representation in such legislature among appropriate districts so as to 
conform to the constitution and laws of such State insofar as is possible consistent 
with the requirements of the Constitution of the United States, and the court 
may make such further orders pertaining thereto and to the conduct of elections 
as may be appropriate." Id. at 21866. 
89. Id. at 22051 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1964). 
90. N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1964, p. I, col. 7. 
91. Id., Oct. 2, 1964, p. I, col. 6. 
92. 110 CONG. REC. 22722, 22851 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1964). 
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to naught. Once more, as so often in the past, when the implications 
of the proposed limitation were made clear, the Congress would not 
quite cross the threshold of no return. However substantial may 
have been the sentiment in Congress that the Supreme Court's 
reapportionment decisions somehow extended judicial power too 
far-and clearly that was the view of many-the ultimately prevail-
ing view was that such disagreement with the Court should be 
expressed in a constitutional amendment rather than legislation. 
The regulatory power of Congress in relation to the federal judi-
ciary has been again recognized as an authority over jurisdiction in 
its procedural sense, and not as a power of limitation on matters 
of substance. 
Interestingly enough, even at the height of the controversy, when 
it appeared likely that some kind of jurisdictional limitation would 
be approved, the lower federal courts seemed unaffected. The three-
judge district court in Oklahoma, one of the states most talked 
about in the Senate debate, continued with its arrangements for 
a second primary election to be conducted in that state on the basis 
of newly approved election district lines.93 Equally striking was the 
action of the three-judge court in Connecticut, which enjoined the 
holding of any election for the state legislature in the fall of 1964 
because of the failure of the legislature, in special session, to enact 
a new apportionment formula as required by earlier court order.9' 
Support for a constitutional amendment will be tested in 1965. 
This, of course, is appropriate. In anticipation of that debate, one 
may speculate that Senator Dirksen was right, at least to this extent: 
state legislatures and courts, both state and federal, have shown an 
almost surprising willingness to comply with the reapportionment 
decisions of the Supreme Court. Accordingly, it seems unlikely that 
the public can now be stirred to approve constitutional limitation 
of the one man-one vote principle. 
93. In the court-ordered primary of Sept. 29, 1964, final choices were made for 
the elections of November 1964. N.Y. Times, Oct. I, 1964, p. 36, col. 3. 
94. Id., Sept. 25, 1964, p. I, col. 7. 
